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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellee,
CaseNo.20010046-SC

vs.

Priority 12

VALDEN CRAM,
Plaintiff and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal in a criminal case from the Fifth District Court, Washington
County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. The appeal was
originally taken to the Utah Court of Appeals, which had jurisdiction of the case pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(e). After the filing of a timely Notice of Appeal, the
Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Cram's appeal and this Court granted Cram's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari on April 28, 2001. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-4.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Is defendant's re-trial barred by the former jeopardy provisions of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the Utah
1

Constitution, when the Court unilaterally declared a mistrial when the jury had been
deliberating for less than three and a half hours after a two day jury trial? As the Court
determined that pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-403 the declaration of a mistrial was
appropriate, the standard of review is one of correctness. "Legal determinations . . . are
defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances." State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved in the trial court by defendant's
written motion. (See R-810-811, Defendant's motion to dismiss; R-812-821,
memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendant's motion to dismiss; R831-832, plaintiffs response to defendant's motion to dismiss; and R-837, court's order
denying defendant's motion to dismiss.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged with three counts of evading state individual
income tax, liability for the payment of which allegedly arose during the calendar years
1991, 1992, and 1993. Each count was alleged as a second degree felony. The pertinent
state statutes are UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-401, 59-10-541, and 76-8-1101. (See
amended information at R-347-348.) Defendant had previously not filed state income tax
returns on or before the 15th day of April succeeding the close of each of these tax years.
(See R-802 at pages 93-95; R-846 at page 94.) In 1994, the state tax commission
2

obtained an order of the Third Judicial District Court which directed the Defendant's wife
to file tax returns for the subject years. Defendant had returns prepared and he filed them
in deference to the court's order against his wife. (See R-850, State's Exhibit's Nos. 1, 2
and 3.)
On August 17, 1998, a jury was impaneled and sworn to try Appellant
on alleged tax evasion charges. The state's entire case rested upon showing that
defendant had a tax liability for calendar years 1991, 1992 and 1993. The only evidence
the state had to show a tax liability for those years was taken from defendant's tax returns
for those years. (See R-846, pages 95-99.)
Defendant contended that the tax returns were not admissible as prima facie
evidence of the accuracy of any entry made or calculation arrived at in the individual
documents contained therein. (R.846, pp. 146-153.)
The state relied heavily upon the declarations made in the income tax
returns which the defendant had been required by court order to file. In his closing
argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to "take a few minutes to go through Exhibits 1,
2, and 3, and look at those tax returns that [the appellant] submitted in 1994
(R.802, page 214.) The prosecutor then went on to tout these exhibits as evidence of
"income which [appellant] had earned during those three years." Id. Finally, the
prosecutor "did have a tax obligation under the Utah individual income tax for the year
1991, the year 1992, and 1993." Id. This, of course, was an element of the offenses
charged.
3

a.

The case went to the jury at 6:48 p.m. on August 18.1 After

deliberating for about two hours, the jury reported through the bailiff that it was unable to
reach a verdict. See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, page 227. The district
court went back on the record at 9:09 p.m., after having previously determined that it
would charge the jury further, using what is sometimes referred to as a "deadlock
instruction." At that time, appellant's trial counsel asked the court to declare the
proceedings a mistrial. See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, pages 227-28.
The court charged the jury further and at 9:16 p.m. sent it back to deliberate. See R-802,
transcript of second day of jury trial, page 230; Instruction No. 16.
b.

Shortly thereafter, the court called counsel into chambers for the

purpose of considering two handwritten notes which the jury had submitted through the
bailiff. The first considered was the jury's request that it be provided a copy of the text of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-542 which was referenced in the state tax commission

certificates attached to the face of and which "authenticated" State's Exhibit Nos. 1, 2,
and 3. The note read: "On state Exhibit #3 Utah Code Annotated 59-10-542 (1953 as
amended) We would like to know what the code says." See R-850, Court's Exhibit No.
1.
Section 59-10-542, in relevant part and with our emphasis added, provides:

1

All time-clock references are based upon the time signature appearing on the
official videotape record of the proceedings and not necessarily upon the court's stated
approximations of the time which were articulated for the record. There are no material
discrepancies.
4

The certificate of the [state tax] commission to the effect that
a tax has not been paid, that a return has not been filed, or that
information has not been supplied, as required by or under the
provisions of this chapter, shall be prima facie evidence that
such tax has not been paid, that such return has not been
filed, or that such information has not been supplied.
c.

The court and counsel briefly discussed this request prior to going on

the record. During these discussions, the court was apparently laboring under some
misapprehension concerning the subject matter of the referenced code section.2 The court
suggested that the reference which the state tax commission certificates made to § 59-10542 was apparently made in error. When the court went on the record in chambers at
9:55 p.m., the state's prosecutor offered the following in response to the jury's request.
[THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: As I previously stated, I
think I'd just tell them that that section is not relevant to their
analysis of at least that document. I don't know about the
other two. Since the question didn't ask about the other two,
do they understand it or not, I don't know.
See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, page 231. Operating under the same
misapprehension, appellant's trial counsel offered a suggestion which prompted the
following response from the prosecutor:
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: I think that we should
probably let them know that that was apparently an erroneous
reference to the code and it should not be considered by them.
[THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: I'm just afraid that

2

The introductory heading in § 59-10-542 reads: "Venue of offenses —
Evidence." The first sentence of the text refers to matters relevant only for the purpose
of establishing venue.
5

erroneous just sounds bad on my part as far as the evidence.
The court and counsel considered this second note while still on the record in
chambers. The question it contained further signaled a potential problem for the
prosecution, the fact of which now became immediately apparent. That note read: "If
there is proof from the State of Utah, that income is taxable, By law, Utah law. Was it
shown in court Today[?]" See R-850, Court's Exhibit No. 2. For obvious reasons, the
appellant was no longer interested in a mistrial.
These two notes indicated that the jury had indeed taken the court's supplemental
instruction to heart and was making a conscientious effort to reach a verdict.
d.

While the court and counsel were still framing responses to the jury's

notes, the bailiff left the court's chambers and returned a few moments later. It was 10:01
p.m. When the bailiff opened the door and stood at the threshold, the state's prosecutor
asked: "No more questions?" When the bailiff responded in the negative, appellant's
trial counsel commented: "That's what I was expecting." And the state's prosecutor
quipped: "Once they get rolling."3 The judge was still in the process of completing his
written responses and invited counsel to review them prior to their submission to the jury.
The court then went off the record. It was now 10:02 p.m.
When the court went back on the record only 13 minutes later, the following

3

These exchanges are "on the [videotape] record," but do not appear in the
transcript. Had the transcriber included these remarks, they would have appeared near the
bottom of T 233.
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exchange between the court and the foreperson of the jury began:
THE COURT: We're again back on the record. The members
of the jury are returned to the courtroom. The parties are
present. The attorneys are present.
Let me ask first of all who was selected as the chairperson of
the jury?
(No verbal response on tape.)
THE COURT: Mr. Holt?
[THE FOREPERSON]: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And the report I've received through
the bailiff is that the jury has been unable to reach a
unanimous decision. Is that correct?
[THE FOREPERSON]: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you think that any additional
period of time for deliberation would make any difference?
[THE FOREPERSON]: No.
THE COURT: All right. All right, and do you have any
question that you want to ask about that? There have been a
couple of notes passed and some response given, although
perhaps not as much response as you had hoped. Any
question or [THE FOREPERSON]: No. (Inaudible).
THE COURT: All right. Are those questions that you have
not sent out to me so far?
[THE FOREPERSON]: Well, yes and no.
THE COURT: Yes and no. Okay. All right. I guess I need to
make sure I understand then. If there were a couple of
7

questions answered, do you think you could reach a verdict or
it would be at least worth deliberating longer or do you think
that would just confirm the positions of decisions that the
jurors have reached?
[THE FOREPERSON]: Well, speaking for myself, it would
probably (inaudible).
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
Counsel, is there any record that you would like to make at
this point?
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: I don't have anything, your
Honor.
[THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. All right.
Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm not going to
require you to stay any longer. I am going to release you
from your duties here and excuse you to go home.
See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, pages 234-35.
e.

When the district court set the matter back on the trial calendar, the

appellant moved to dismiss on a "plea" of once in jeopardy. Upon hearing the motion,
the court agreed that the petitioner had not consented to the discharge of the jury and the
termination of the prior proceedings. However, the lower court denied the motion,
relying upon the language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-403(4)(c)(iv) and concluding that
petitioner's trial had been properly terminated.
Cram timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals concluded that inasmuch as Cram had made no objection to the trial court's
8

decision to declare a mistrial, he "failed to adequately preserve his objections" and
affirmed the district court. (See, photocopy of the Utah Court of Appeals unpublished
slip opinion issued in this matter, attached as Addendum No. 7).

ARGUMENT

POINT I
I.

PETITIONER DID NOT CONSENT TO THE MISTRIAL IN THE
INSTANT CASE.

In this case, in denying Cram's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court reasoned that
defendant's trial was properly terminated under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-403. That
section states that a criminal trial may be properly, although prematurely, terminated
where the trial court "finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary
because the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict." The analysis which led the district
court to deny defendant's motion was arguably limited to the application of the plain
language of the statute and did not involve any consideration of the constitutional context
within which the statue necessarily operates. The Utah Court of Appeals, while affirming
the trial court's ruling in this regard, additionally concluded that inasmuch as the
defendant made no objection contemporaneously with the declaration of the mistrial, he
failed to adequately preserve his objection. Slip op., at 1-2. The opinion then goes on to
indicate that because the defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court, the issue
cannot be considered on its merits on appeal. Slip op., at 2.

9

In point of fact, the defendant did raise the issue in the trial court. The record
clearly demonstrates that the defendant moved the trial court to dismiss the charges when
the matter came on for scheduling. (R.810-811, motion to dismiss; R.812-821,
memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendant's motion to dismiss;
R.831-832, plaintiffs response to defendant's motion to dismiss, and R.834-836, order
denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Indeed, the Court of Appeals concedes this fact.
See Slip op., at 1, fh. 2. In sum and substance, the Court of Appeals concluded that in
failing to make a contemporaneous objection, he consented to the mistrial and could not
effectively raise the issue thereafter in the trial court or on appeal. By framing the issue
in terms of defendant's alleged failure to raise the issue in the trial court, the court of
appeals avoided addressing the real issue, namely, whether the defendant consented to the
mistrial. In so doing, the court of appeals sidestepped the necessity of deciding this case
in the context of controlling caselaw, to-wit: State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah
1979) and State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993).
"The double jeopardy protection is not so ephemeral that it vanishes if an accused
does not anticipate and object to every unexpected action on the part of the court."
Ambrose, 598 P.2d, at 360-61. Mere silence or failure to object to the jury's discharge is
not such consent as will constitute waiver of a former jeopardy plea. State v. Fenton, 19
Ariz. App. 274, 506 P.2d 665 (1973); People v. Compton, 6 Cal.3d 55, 98 Cal.Rptr. 217,
490 P.2d 537 (1971); Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 382 (1964). See
generally, Annot. 63 A.L.R.2d 782 § 5 (1959).
10

In State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993), the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling that the accused could not be retried where the state moved for
dismissal when the alleged victim unexpectedly changed her testimony regarding the date
of the alleged offense. The state contended that Nilson had consented to the termination of
his first trial when his counsel stated: "I have no objection to the motion to dismiss." The
court noted:
The facts of this case do not allow us to construe Nilson's articulated lack of
objection as constituting consent to the State's motion to dismiss. . . . When
the State moved for dismissal to expedite the inevitable [acquittal], Nilson
had no obligation to warn that double jeopardy might bar a subsequent
reprosecution. Nor should he be required to actively oppose the dismissal of
charges against him and insist that the inevitable scenario be played out, on
pain of losing his protections under the double jeopardy clause. Given the
dialogue about a probable directed verdict, the rapidity of the proceedings,
and lack of argument by the State that the circumstances constituted "legal
necessity" for declaration of a mistrial, we find Nilson's response was
inadequate to constitute consent.
Id., at 1032.
In the course of considering defendant's motion to dismiss in the instant case, the
State argued that as the defendant had requested a mistrial, prior to the Court's sua sponte
declaring a mistrial, that he had in some fashion consented to the mistrial. (R.826-827.)
The trial court obviously rejected that argument instead holding that pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-403 a declaration of a mistrial was proper. (R.835.) The defense

articulated by defendant in this matter was that the State had been unable to produce any
evidence that defendant had a tax liability other than the possibly erroneous tax returns of
defendant. (R.850, State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.) After defendant had requested the
11

mistrial, the jury sent a note requesting guidance as to whether the state had proven that
defendant had taxable income pursuant to Utah law. (R.850, Court's Exhibit No. 2.) At
that point, it was obvious that the jury had taken the trial court's deadlock instruction
seriously and was considering the evidence before it. The trial court refused to find that
defendant had consented to a mistrial and there is no reason to disturb that finding on
appeal.
If the rule of law which the court of appeals has applied in deciding this case had
been applied in Ambrose and Nilson, the defendants in those cases would have been
subject to further prosecution. Neither of them objected to the termination of the
proceeding. Like the defendant in the instant case, the defendants in those cases raised
their objections after the state took steps to further prosecute the matters.
The court of appeals' reliance on State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tfll, 10 P.3d 346 is
clearly misplaced. Quoting Holgate, the court of appeals concluded that "[a] defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 'enhancing]
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, . . . claiming] on appeal
that the Court should reverse.'" Slip op., at 2. In Holgate, the defendant withheld any
objection until after he was convicted. In this instant case, as in other former-jeopardy
cases, the defendant has not been convicted, nor is there reason to conclude that he
necessarily would have been had the proceedings continued to verdict. The defendant did
not remain silent while flawed proceedings continued to a conviction. He stood mute
while the court terminated a trial in which he may well have been acquitted. He was under
12

"no obligation to warn that double jeopardy might bar a subsequent reprosecution."
Mfao/i,854P.2d,atl032.
In United States ex rel Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert denied,
414 U.S. 1023 (1973), the defendant moved for a mistrial after learning that the jury was
deadlocked. The trial court did not specifically rule on the motion but sent the jury to a
motel for the evening. The following day, without consulting either the defense or
prosecution, the trial court granted a mistrial because the jury was exhausted. The
defendant objected to the mistrial after the jury had been dismissed. In concluding that the
defendant did not consent to the mistrial even though the trial court stated that it was
granting the defendant's motion from the previous day, the court reasoned that the
defendant's motion was made for reasons different than that upon which the court ruled,
the defendant could have concluded that there was a strong possibility for a verdict and
therefore his assessment of his chances for an acquittal changed, and the defendant had no
opportunity to object when the court declared a mistrial. Id., at 16. The court wrote, "We
see no reason to lock him into a motion once it is made." Id.
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 607, 400 N.E.2d 242 (1980), defendant
Jones was tried with a co-defendant, one Frank Rivera, who was represented by separate
counsel. During the impanelment of the jury the judge made a number of caustic remarks
about both defense counsel, apparently prompted by their conduct. The most serious was
an exchange between the trial judge and Jones's counsel which tended to disparage
Jones's counsel's legal ability. After the jurors were excused Rivera's counsel made an
13

oral motion for mistrial in which Jones's counsel joined. The court denied the oral
motion. The next morning, Jones filed a written motion for mistrial. The record contained
no references to the written motion until a discussion which occurred six days later
concerning whether a mistrial ought to be granted.
Contrary to the Commonwealth's expectations as expressed in the prosecutor's
opening statement, the government's eyewitness did not identify Jones as having been at
the scene of the crime. As a result of this failure of proof, counsel for Jones said little or
nothing for the first two days of testimony and Jones obtained directed verdicts at the close
of the Commonwealth's case on two of the four indictments.
Later, when Rivera made a second motion for mistrial, Jones objected. The court
informed Jones that he was granting his prior motion for a mistrial, which had been taken
under advisement. Counsel then formally waived the earlier motion, explaining that it had
been based on the events occurring during impanelment and that any prejudice arising in
that regard had since been abated. The proceedings were thereafter declared a mistrial.
Jones's motion to dismiss the remaining indictments on double jeopardy grounds was
denied and he appealed.
The Appeals Court concluded that Jones had not consented to the mistrial by filing
a motion for mistrial based on the jury impanelment, that there was no judicial
overreaching and that on the record the Commonwealth had demonstrated a "manifest
necessity" for the mistrial. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387
N.E.2d 1187 (1979). Upon further appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
14

the high court agreed that Jones had not consented to the mistrial, but concluded that the
record did not support the conclusion that there was "manifest necessity" for the mistrial.
The remaining indictments were ordered dismissed.
Although the trial court had purported to act upon Jones's mistrial motion, the
Commonwealth did not contend that Jones had consented to the mistrial. Instead, the
Commonwealth argued that by not requesting a hearing and a ruling on his written motion
for a mistrial Jones contributed to the ultimate declaration of a mistrial, an argument not
unlike the one which the state has advanced in the instant case. In holding that Jones had
not "contributed" to the granting of the mistrial, the Massachusetts court noted that Jones's
oral motion had been denied at the time it was made. Since the written motion set forth
essentially the same grounds, Jones could well have concluded that the written motion had
been denied. Moreover, a "request for a mistrial may, with the mere passage of time, be
considered as having been improvidently made and fortunately denied." Id., at 621. The
court concluded:
A defendant is entitled to withdraw a motion for mistrial which is initially
not granted and then later revived by the court. If a Judge decides to rest the
decision to declare a mistrial on a defendant's earlier motion, the Judge must
inquire whether the defendant wishes to maintain the motion. See Note,
Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 449, 557 (1977). If the defendant
makes it clear in answer to the Judge's inquiry that he wishes to withdraw
the earlier motion for a mistrial, the Judge must then decide whether there is
"manifest necessity" for a mistrial over the defendant's objection. If the
motion for mistrial is withdrawn by the defendant, the Judge may not rely on
the earlier request for mistrial as permitting a mistrial by consent. "Where
the request for mistrial is not granted and the trial proceedings resume, the
defendant is again entitled to resume control over the course of those
proceedings, a control which would be meaningless if subject to defeasance
15

through a purported grant of a request made prior to the resumption of
control." Braxton v. United States, 395 A.2d 759, 767 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978).
See Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, cert, denied, 423 U.S. 934
(1975); United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Maes v. District Court, 180 Colo. 169
(1972).
Id., at 621-22. Cf. Gershon v. Sardonia, 50 Misc. 2d 423, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)
("During the course of a trial the picture constantly changes and a motion made and denied
may eventually benefit the party who moved"); United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d
865, 872 (1st Cir. 1977) ("concerns which led counsel to file the motion . . . [may be]
dissipated in light of later events .. ."); Lovinger v. Circuit Court, 845 F.2d 739, 743-44
(7th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988) (defendant did not consent to mistrial despite
his earlier motion because his motion was perfunctory, the court's mistrial was based on
another ground, the court did not mention the earlier decision, and that because of the
State's "foibles," the defendant's assessment of his chances of acquittal may well have
changed).

In the instant case, defendant's motion for mistrial was motivated by defense

counsel's desire to avoid having the jury instructed further. R 802, at pp. 227-28. Clearly,
there is some legitimate concern that an Allen instruction may compromise the defendant's
right to the independent judgment of each individual jury. See Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492 (1896); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992). That motion was denied
and the jury was sent back to deliberate further.
In this case, in the Court below, when the court and counsel next conferred it was
for the purpose of formulating responses to questions from the jury, not for the purpose of
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discussing any continuing deadlock. While the jury had not arrived at a consensus, it was
deliberating. Jurors may not reach agreement for days, but as long as they are
deliberating, they are not deadlocked.
When the court went back into session, the court began questioning the foreperson
concerning the state of the jury's deliberations. R 802, at pp. 234-37. The court then,
without first indicating to counsel its intention to do so, declared the proceedings a
mistrial. Following his questioning of the foreperson, the court asked counsel if they
wanted to make a further record. Had the court stated that it intended to declare a mistrial
or that it was entertaining the motion which the defendant had previously made, counsel
would have had an opportunity to indicate whether he intended to maintain or withdraw
the motion, if indeed the motion remained extant. It does not require an experienced trial
lawyer or an exceptional jurist to recognize the fact that the circumstances had
substantially changed with the submission of the questions from the jury.
The district court did not indicate that it was reconsidering defendant's spent
motion as a basis for declaring a mistrial because the court did not resort to the motion as a
basis for terminating the proceedings. Indeed, in denying defendant's motion to dismiss
on double jeopardy grounds, the lower court had the intellectual integrity to concede that
the court had declared the mistrial on the basis of its perception of necessity rather than
attempting to assign the termination of the proceedings to the defendant's motion or his
consent manifest in some other manner.
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Clearly, the defendant did not consent to or otherwise seduce the district court into
declaring the mistrial.
POINT II
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A
SHOWING THAT "MANIFEST NECESSITY" REQUIRED MISTRIAL
IN INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.
A.

Before the District Court May Declare a Mistrial, There Must be
Manifest Necessity for Such a Determination.

The court of appeals briefly turned its attention to the merits of defendant's
contention regarding the determination which had been reached by the trial court on the
merits of the case, noting: "Were we to address the merits of defendant's double jeopardy
claim, our ultimate conclusion would not change." Slip op., at 2. After making this
observation, the court of appeals simply cited caselaw without engaging in any real
analysis of the law in the context of the facts of this case.
The trial court's discretion in discharging the jury is far from unbridled. There
must be a factual basis for the exercise of this discretion. Otherwise stated: "When
ordering a mistrial, the trial court must support its ruling by showing that legal necessity
required mistrial in interests of justice." State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (Quoting State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979)). Moreover, this
discretion is properly exercised only in "very extraordinary and striking circumstances."
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963).
In assessing the propriety of the premature termination of a criminal trial, "[w]e
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resolve any doubt 'in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather than exercise what would be
an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion."' Id., at 738, 83 S.Ct, at 103536 {quoting United States v. Watson, 28 Fed.Cas. 499, 501).
The trial court faced with the decision of whether it should prematurely terminate a
criminal trial ordinarily finds itself on the horns of a very real dilemma. On the one hand,
if it discharges the jury when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the accused
is deprived of his "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,"
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S., at 503, and upon retrial will likely suffer additional
disadvantage as a consequence of the aborted proceedings.4 On the other hand, if the court
fails to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after "protracted and
exhausting" deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result from
pressures inherent in the situation rather than from the considered judgment of, in the
instant case, eight independent triers of fact. Id., at 509.
In the case before the court, the status of the deliberations cannot reasonably be
described as "protracted" or "exhausting" and the attendant circumstances certainly were
not of such a nature as would have created any legitimate concern that, unless the court
acted quickly in discharging the jury, pressures inherent in the ongoing deliberations
would likely produce a "false" verdict. Only thirteen minutes elapsed between the time
the court went off the record after consulting with counsel concerning the propriety and

4

See footnote 2, supra.
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content of its proposed written responses to the jury's inquiries and that point in time when
the court went back on the record with the parties present and the jury in the box and
began questioning the jury foreperson concerning a "reported" deadlock. The jury would
have scarcely had time to review, let alone consider and implement, the court's responses
to its handwritten notes.
In the absence of any real pressure suggesting the need to immediately terminate
the proceeding based upon the risk of an impending false verdict, there was little if
anything which could have arguably justified the abandonment of efforts to preserve the
petitioner's "valued right" to have his "confrontation with society" concluded in that
proceeding. The premature termination of a criminal trial under such circumstances as
existed in the instant case is a clear abuse of discretion, unless it is abundantly clear that
further deliberations would have been so meaningless as to be unjustifiable on the basis of
nothing more than the mere inconvenience of the additional time spent.
Some guidance is provided § 5.4(c) by as Standards Relating to Trial by Jury
(Approved Draft 1968): "The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement." Emphasis
added. Cf. Muniz v. State, 573 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (jury may be
discharged once it appears "altogether improbable" that it could agree upon a verdict).
Such a showing may be based upon the jury's concession that it is hopelessly deadlocked,
provided its deliberations have been of such duration as to indicate that the jury has had
time to consider the evidence in its complexity or its simplicity.
20

B.

Length of Deliberations vs. Complexity of the Case.

While the jury's acknowledgment of hopeless deadlock is a circumstance which
may justify the discharge of the jury, in exercising that discretion, the trial court should
consider the length of the deliberations in light of the length of the trial and the volume
and complexity of the evidence. See State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash. 2d 733, 739, 585 P.2d
789 (1978). Otherwise stated, the exercise of discretion in declaring a mistrial will be
judged by the amount of time the jury deliberates in light of the nature of the case and the
time that it took the parties to present the evidence. Muniz v. State, supra; Beeman v.
State, 533 S.W.2d 799 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); O'Brien v. State, 455 S.W.2d 283
(Tex.Cr.App.1970).
This discretion, then, must be measured by the time they are kept together
since the improbability that they will agree is made to depend upon the time.
. . . Reasonable time is not the measure of his (judge's) discretion. . . . The
jury must have been kept together for such time as to render it altogether
improbable that they can agree. . . . Not that they would, but that they could
agree.
Powell v. State, 17 Tex. Crim. 345 (1885).
If the jury declares that it is deadlocked before it has had sufficient time to consider
all the relevant evidence, its "concession" is not a declaration of its inability to
purposefully deliberate further, but one of its unwillingness to do so. Jurors who contend
that there is no reasonable probability of reaching an agreement with their fellow jurors,
when they have not first taken the opportunity to review and discuss everything which
must be considered before a reasonable person would determine to stand for a certain
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position, simply do not understand their duty as trial jurors. Their unwillingness to agree
with fellow jurors is not born of a conscientious devotion to the duty which they undertook
by oath.
A juror's first responsibility is to consider all of the evidence before arriving at an
opinion. His second responsibility is to engage in meaningful dialogue with his fellow
jurors so that each may consider the opinions of the other and the factual and legal bases
advanced in support thereof. It is only after he has completed this process that it becomes
his duty, as a matter of conscience, to stand for that position which in his judgment is
supported by the law, the facts, and the justice of the cause.
The trial court that is confronted with premature protestations of deadlock, has a
duty to educate that jury and to charge it anew. That is what "deadlock instructions" are
made for; that is when they are not only permissible but necessary.
If the court discharges the jury upon its declaration of deadlock, the exercise of its
discretion in so doing will be judged as a function of the time spent in deliberations in
relationship to the time required to present the relevant evidence. In Powell v. State,
supra, the appellate court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in discharging the
jury after they had only deliberated for three and one half hours. See also O'Brien v. State,
supra (jury deliberated one hour and ten minutes); Beeman v. State, supra, (two hours);
Grigsby v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 484, 257 S.W.2d 110 (App.1953) (one hour and fortyfive minutes). Cf. Satterwhite v. State, 505 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (jury
deliberated three times as long as was required to present the evidence); Willis v. State,
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518 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (deliberated three times as long as it took the parties
to put on their cases); Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (deliberated
nearly 13 hours over a three-day period after evidence was presented in less than one day).
In the instant case, even if the district court were absolutely convinced that each
juror was of the firm opinion that further deliberations would avail nothing, it could not
have reasonably acted thereon. The questions which the jury had asked of the court
clearly indicated concern, and therefore apparent disagreement among the jurors, about
the evidentiary significance of the state's documentary exhibits and the sufficiency of any
other evidence presented for the purpose of establishing that the defendant had earned
income which created an individual income tax liability. The district court could not have
reasonably concluded that the jury had had sufficient time for each juror to reevaluate his
or her position in light of the further direction they had received from the court.
But even more troubling was the perfunctory manner and speed with which the jury
was discharged on the basis of this "report" of deadlock, is the absence of anything in the
record which indicates that the jury had in fact professed deadlock after it had received
and considered the court's responses to its handwritten notes.

C.

The Jury's Declaration of Deadlock.

An equally serious concern arises from the method which the district court
employed in finding that the jury was in fact "deadlocked." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
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While the length of deliberations is a relevant factor [in determining whether
to discharge a jury], the more important consideration is whether there is a
possibility that the jury can reach a verdict within a reasonable time. The
most reliable source as to this information is the jury itself.
United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1972). Cf. Commentary, ABA
Standards § 5.4(c). Obviously, if the jury, through its foreman and of its own accord,
acknowledges that it is hopelessly deadlocked, there may be a factual basis for discharge
"//the other jurors agree with the foreman." State v. Jones, 97 Wash. 2d 159, 641 P.2d
708 (1982) (emphasis added).
Some jurisdictions explicitly favor questioning the individual juror concerning his
or her perception of the status of the deliberations; none have forbidden it. The ABA
commentary reflects the rule in California that,
Ordinarily the trial judge should not discharge a jury on the ground that there
is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree without questioning the
jurors individually as to such probability.
Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 1, 7, 22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641 (1962)
(emphasis added). The failure of the trial judge to inquire of the individual jurorfs ability
to reach a verdict has been held by the Alaska Supreme Court to be a factor in determining
whether the judge discharged the jury prematurely. Koehler v. Alaska, 519 P.2d 442
(Alaska 1974). Preferable practice demands that the trial court first caution the jury that
only a "yes" or "no" response is desired and then ask each juror if he or she agrees that a
hopeless deadlock which could not be resolved by further deliberations exists. See United
States ex rel Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975); United
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States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert, denied 420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1428,
43 L.Ed.2d 673; State v. Nelson, 234 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1975); Paulson v. Superior Court
of El Dorado County, supra.
The record in the instant case indicates that the court asked a few cursory questions
of the jury foreperson after the jury had purportedly, for a second time, indicated an
impasse at reaching a verdict. The court's examination came after a brief consultation
with counsel, in chambers, regarding the two questions that had then been put to the court
by the jury.
The court did not inquire as to whether or not the jurors were "able to deliberate
further," but only whether, in the opinion of the foreperson, further deliberations might be
worthwhile. The foreperson's response to this inquiry is not clear from the record:
THE COURT: . . . . If there were a couple of questions answered, do you
think you could reach a verdict or it would be at least worth deliberating
longer or do you think that would just confirm the positions or decisions that
the jurors have reached?
THE FOREPERSON]: Well, speaking for myself, it would probably
(inaudible).
(R.802, at page 253.) If the jurors could still deliberate, which they were apparently
willing to do, the jury should have been required to make the attempt.
Moreover, the jury foreperson did not claim to speak for the other members of the
jury in responding to the court's question concerning the probable value of any further
deliberation. Indeed, he made a point of expressly disclaiming the ability to or propriety
of attempting to answer for anyone other than himself: "Well, speaking for myself, it
25

would probably (inaudible)." Emphasis added. (R.802, at pp. 235-236.) The record does
not satisfactorily demonstrate the basis of the district court's decision to discharge the jury
and declare a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the Utah Court of Appeal's Memorandum Decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of August, 2001.

®PY
AARON J. PRISBREY
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
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Laura B. Dupaix
Utah Attorney General's Office
Criminal Appeals Division
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
(2 copies)
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ADDENDUM NO. 1
AMENDMENT V TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use.

ADDENDUM NO. 2
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (1999)
§12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

ADDENDUM NO. 3
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
PART 4. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-403
§ 76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same
episode
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out
of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried
under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier
of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense even
though the conviction for the lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside,
or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted
by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place before
the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the
first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary because:

(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state makes
it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, §
3.
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PAUL DAME #
Deputy Washington County Attorney
178 North, 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
WADE WINEGAR #5561
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

V.

CASE NO. 961501097

VALDEN CRAM,
Defendant,

:

JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM

On Monday, February 1, 1999, a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge G. Rand
Beacham on the above captioned case regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant was
present and represented by counsel Aaron J. Prisbey. Assistant Attorney General Wade S.
Winegar represented the State. After hearing argument from both counsel, the Court makes the
following findings and order:

The Court hereby finds that according to U.C.A. 76-1-403 and Utah case law on the
issue, the mistrial declared in this matter on August 18, 1998 was not an improper termination of
the prosecution and resulted because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. The Court
further finds a proper record was made at the time the mistrial was declared and thus orders as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be denied.

Dated this ffr^day of February, 1999.

(^,cy^^
G. Rand Beacham
District Court Judge
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Approved as to form

Aaron J. Prisbey
Counsel for Defendant

Certificate of Service

I certify that on the

day of February, 1999,1 sent or caused to be sent, by First Class

Mail and Fax, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Order to the following:
Aaron J. Prisbey
1071 east 100 South Bldg. D, Suite 3
St. George, Utah 84770
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ADDENDUM NO, 7

Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 2 1 2000
.--•"

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

00O00

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 990506-CA

v.

F I L E D
(December 21, 2000)

Valden Cram,
Defendant and Appellant.

)

2000 UT App 375'

Fifth District, St. George Department
The Honorable G. Rand Beachanf
Attorneys:

Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for
Aooellee

Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Thome.
THORNS, Judge:
Defendant Valden Cram appeals from an order denying his
motion to dismiss a subsequent charge, following the trial
court's declaracion of mistrial. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial courtfs denial of his motion
to dismiss violates the Fifth Amendment right against being" twice
cut in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.1 We disagree.
Defendant's mocion to dismiss followed the trial court's decision
to declare a mistrial after determining that the jury was unable
to reach a verdict. Defendant made no objection to the trial
court's decision to declare a mistrial.2 We have explained that
1. Defendant also argues that the trial court's dismissal of his
motion violates Utah Const, art. I, § 12, but he presents this
court no independent analysis of how the trial court's ruling
violates the State constitutional provision, therefore, we do not
address this issue. See Utah R. App. P. 24.
2. In fact, defendant waited until the scheduling conference for
the new trial to alert the court of his objection to the
(continued...)

"Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.f" State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). This is particularly true where, as here,
the trial court could have resolved defendant's timely objection
before the jury was discharged.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court
may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74,1111,
10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, "964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah
1998)). The preservation rule, as it is known, "applies to every
claim, including constitutional questions." Id. (emphasis
added). Utah does, however, recognize three exceptions to the
preservation rule: (1) plain error, (2) exceptional
circumstances, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. See
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Defendant fails to argue any of these three exceptions to
the preservation rule. Rather, defendant acknowledges that he
knew the court was contemplating a mistrial, but believed he was
not obligated to object. Defendant was in error. "[A] defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the
strategy of 'enhanc[ing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and
then, if that strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the
Court should reverse.1" Holcate, 2000 UT 74 at 1J11 (alterations
in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendant has
failed to adequately preserve his objection.
Were we to address the merits of defendant's double jeopardy
claim, our ultimate conclusion would not change. The Utah
Supreme Court has explained that "[w]hen . . . the jury is unable
to reach a verdict, . . . a defendant may be retried
notwithstanding the double jeopardy clause." State v. Musselman,
667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added) (citing Lee v.
United States, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S. C t. 2141 (1977); State v.
Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P.2d 394 (1971); State v. Gardner,
62 Utah 62, 217 P. 976 (1923); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1980)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(4)
(1999) (codifying the protection against double jeopardy).
However, "Utah courts have interpreted the protection against
double jeopardy . . . to mean that upon the declaration of
mistrial, a defendant may not be retried on the same charge
unless a 'legal necessity' justified termination of the trial."
West Vallev Citv v. Patten. 1999 UT App 149,110, 981 P.2d 420
(citation omitted).
2 . (. ..continued)
mistrial.
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In Patten, we set forth the standards previously articulated
by our supreme court in State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah
1979), for determining whether "legal necessity" exists for
granting a mistrial. First, the "trial court must give an
explanation for its decision and discuss possible 'curative
alternatives to a mistrial.'" Patten, 1999 UT App 14 at ^11
(citation omitted). "Second, the trial court must enter findings
of fact supporting its decision . . . ." Id. Finally, the trial
court "may not declare a mistrial 'so abruptly . . . that
defendant's counsel ha[s] no opportunity to object.'" Id.
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
In the present matter, the trial court, on two separate
occasions, inquired of the jury foreperson whether additional
deliberation time or the court answering additional questions
would facilitate a verdict. On both occasions, the jury
foreperson responded "no." We conclude that the trial court
discussed "'possible curative alternatives to a mistrial.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
The dialogue between the trial court and the jury
foreperson, the subsequent Minute Entry chronicling the time the
jury deliberated, the court's supplemental "deadlock" instruction
to the jury, and the time spent conferring with counsel--all
contained in the record--demonstrate that sufficient grounds
exist to support the trial court's declaration of mistrial. We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
declaring a mistrial.
Finally, the trial court clearly did "not declare a mistrial
'so abruptly . . . that defendant's counsel ha [d] no opportunity
to object.'" Id. (quoting Ambrose, 593 P.2d at 360). The trial
court, on two separate occasions, asked defendant's counsel if he
would like to go on record in response to the jury's inability to
reach a verdict or inquire of the jury foreperson. Defendant's
counsel declined on both occasions. Accordingly, we are
convinced than the trial court complied with the standards set
forth in Ambrose and that a "'legal necessity' justified
termination of [defendant's] trial." Id. at 1fl0 (citation
omitted). The trial judge was properly exercising his discretion
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when he declared a mistrial. Double jeopardy does not bar
defendant's subsequent retrial and conviction.

Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed.

William A. Thorne, Jr.,''Judge
WE CONCUR:
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